Lessons learned from “Worst Draft in Years”, the 2020 NBA Draft

Setting the Record straight about the 2020 Draft

Retrospectively, the 2020 draft was pretty great. It saw a few budding stars (Anthony Edwards, LaMelo Ball, Tyrese Haliburton) go in the lottery, not to mention a handful of high end role players (Desmond Bane, Cole Anthony, Saddiq Bey, Precious Achiuwa) thereafter. Most importantly to Philadelphians, it gave us Tyrese Maxey, a guy who you’d probably put at the top of the second group if you live outside of the City of Brotherly Hate, but remains untouchable to Sixers fans during Kevin Durant trade talks.

Undeniably, the 2020 Draft was a success. But it wasn’t always seen that way.

Sports Illustrated’s Jeremy Woo wrote a piece in December of 2019 calling the 2020 draft class “The Worst NBA Draft in Years”. He wasn’t alone. Every outlet seemingly called the draft weak in some way or another, and excitement for the draft was nowhere to be found. The draft itself was the least viewed in over a decade, not to mention down 16.5% in TV rating from the previous year’s selection of Zion Williamson by the New Orleans Pelicans.

I like to think I have an eye for NBA talent, but some things are undeniable. While I may brag to our friends about how I saw Timberwolves star Anthony Edwards’ greatness from his tenure at Georgia, the reality is that the 2020 draft held a lot more questions than answers not only for me, but for every talent evaluator. It was a down year, until it wasn’t.

But it can’t be that simple. We can’t let ourselves off of the hook that easily. If we are to learn about how to scout moving forward, we need to look ourselves in the mirror and say “what did we miss about this 2020 draft class?”. So, that’s exactly what we’re doing. I want to examine a few players from the 2020 draft: First, their pre-draft perception; Then, how they turned out; and finally, what lessons we can learn from their evaluation process.

But this is going to be less about evaluating the talent, and more about managing perceptions. We’re going to look a lot more about what everyone thought about these guys than, say, their combine numbers. It’s a different way of analyzing data, but one that I think we can take a lot of lessons from for future draft seasons.

Some notes, before we get started. To avoid retrospection, I want to use archives from what people were saying before the 2020 draft process. This is to avoid being the “I called it” guy. It doesn’t mean anything to say you always knew Desmond Bane was going to be special unless you thought it at the time. If he wasn’t in the top 10 of your big board at the time, how can anyone take that claim seriously? So here we’re going to look at media archives, and especially Mike Vorkunov’s Consensus Board for the Athletic. Media perception is really important in this process because it more or less tracks popular opinion around the draft, as the media are gatekeepers for draft insight to the public.

Anthony Edwards (#1 overall to the Minnesota Timberwolves)

Anthony DeVante Edwards. Ant Man. The savior of the floundering Minnesota Timberwolves franchise; the primary reason they just gave up four first round picks for Rudy Gobert. Anthony Edwards is the face of the franchise up north, and with good reason. He averaged 21 points, nearly 5 rebounds and almost 4 assists for the Timberwolves last season en route to their first playoff berth since 2018. Not only that, but Antman went toe to toe with All-NBA guard Ja Morant, taking the second-seeded Grizzlies to six games. 2022 marked the first time the Wolves have won two playoff games in a postseason since Kevin Garnett was lacing up in Minnesota.

But let’s look at what the Timberwolves, and others, thought of him in 2020.

As far as media perception goes, Anthony Edwards was locked in a three-way tie with LaMelo Ball and James Wiseman on the consensus board. No one knew who was better at the time. There were upsides to each of the prospects, as well as seemingly unignorable downsides. Edwards was no different.

Ant only shot 40% from the field in college, and 29% from three. Those are… not exactly good splits. When taking a guy with the number 1 pick, you don’t want to have questions as to whether or not he may be the next Dion Waiters. However, even despite those splits, people saw potential in the kid. That potential was usually centered around the fact that his team at Georgia stunk (okay, fair) and that he possessed special athleticism not seen often, even in NBA draft circles. That bounce, combined with a strong build and 6’9 wingspan, were enough to entice the Timberwolves into snagging the former Bulldog with the first pick.

But to tell the story so simply isn’t really the truth. Sure, the Timberwolves may have liked him more than anyone else, but the fact remains that they tried to trade the #1 pick relentlessly. They wanted a win-now player, or even simply to trade down out of #1 to a lower draft slot.

I remember this whole process vividly, and thinking to myself how I understand Minnesota's reasoning for trying to trading down. With three consensus guys, you don’t want to pass up on two guys that have a realistic chance of being better than the one you take. Not only was trading down a way the Timberwolves could add value in the draft, but they could also still potentially end up with a franchise guy at #3 instead of #1. Theoretically, this way they could avoid the media backlash of missing on the draft because, even if they miss with the third pick, they took a potential #1 guy at #3 instead of #1. Minnesota GM Gersson Rosas may have settled on Ant in the end, but his willingness to move out of the pick is proof enough that Ant was more of a last resort than a can’t miss prospect.

Lesson Learned: Leave no stone unturned during the draft process.

LaMelo Ball (#3 overall to the Charlotte Hornets)

Full disclosure: LaMelo was my #1 player in this draft. I really liked the vision, and the 6’8 frame always says to me that there is really a higher floor than most would suggest. I was justified in the long run – LaMelo has looked every bit of a #1 pick thus far in his career on the Hornets. Sure, they haven’t tasted the postseason quite yet, but as Charlotte's second-best player is actively facing domestic violence charges, it becomes harder to blame LaMelo for the Hornets' failures thus far.

But once again, LaMelo was no sure thing. In fact, LeMelo had more questions at the time than any top 3 prospect I can remember. For one, he came from the Ball family, headed by outspoken patriarch LaVar Ball. LaVar’s antics became a sports media mainstay during his oldest son Lonzo Ball’s draft process. While LaVar had been effectively removed from sports media television since Lonzo’s days with the Lakers, his specter still stood over LaMelo. Some teams simply did not want the media circus that came with drafting a Ball brother, as well as LaVar looking over their shoulder during LaMelo’s development.

But LaVar is just the tip of the iceberg for assessing how risky LaMelo was. As a sophomore in high school LaMelo was taken out of American high school to play professionally in Lithuania. His time there was tumultuous – shooting less than 30% from the field and averaging less than 13 minutes a game. After a quick stint with SPIRE – a basketball academy in Ohio – LaMelo returned overseas after multiple eligibility concerns. This time he landed in Australia’s NBL on the Illawarra Hawks, where he averaged 17 points a game along with good rebounding and assist numbers. He was massively inefficient though, shooting only 38% from the field and 25% from long range. The tools were there, and so was the production… but was he a winning player? Could he actually be an efficient player at the next level, or was he doomed to become the next “high upside guy” that flops out of the league in five years? These were the questions being asked by talent evaluators across the league. I’ve never seen a more maligned player before ever playing a game. If this Charlotte Observer article isn’t enough for you, I implore you to type “LaMelo Ball 2020 Bust” into Google and read the results.

He fell to #3 when it was all said and done, with the Warriors opting for another raw prospect in James Wiseman out of Memphis. They’re certainly kicking themselves now, but how could they? Steph and Klay were still injured but under massive contract, and still a Hall of Fame level players when on the court. Their backcourt was set, whereas their frontcourt was being held down by some wicked combination of Draymond Green, Eric Paschall, and Willy Cauley-Stein. With so many questions surrounding LaMelo’s viability, who can blame the Warriors for opting for a big man?

GM Bob Myers and company saw the two prospects as a toss-up it seems, eventually settling on Wiseman’s risk ahead of LaMelo Ball’s simply because of fit. But here I want to highlight how risky LaMelo was. If I were to compare him to a prospect in the 2022 class, perception-wise it would likely be some supercharged hybrid of Ousmane Dieng and Shaedon Sharpe. Would you draft that person #1 or #2 overall? Maybe, but not without holding your breath first.

Regardless, LaMelo’s own perceptions go to show exactly how wild this class was. He was duking it out for draft position with Edwards and Wiseman – two incredibly high-risk guys in their own right. LaMelo’s draft profile also acts for many as fodder to the high-upside philosophy – it’s easy to talk yourself into guys like LaMelo coming around when a few examples such as him exist. What’s a lot less common is them actually hitting – for every LaMelo there is are three Michael Carter-Williams lurking in the shadows. But upside is upside, and in three-man draft, you should almost always just go with one who falls to you.

Lesson Learned: In the top of the lottery, it’s often riskier to play it safe than shoot for the moon. Let the draft come to you, then make the pick no one else wants to make.

Saddiq Bey (#19 overall to the Detroit Pistons)

Saddiq Bey was a fascinating prospect to follow during the 2020 Draft process. My Spurs picked at #11, which represented a sort of turning point in the draft – at least in the pre-draft process. My dream prospect Devin Vassell actually ended up falling to us somehow (thanks, Phoenix), but I was thinking we’d end up with far worse options. At the time, my preferred contingency plan for the Spurs was Saddiq Bey.

Bey ended up going #19 overall to the Detroit Pistons after a great sophomore campaign at Villanova where he averaged 16 points on 45% shooting from downtown. He played tough defense with his 6’8 frame, and he could even pass a little bit during his time in college. Sure, Bey was a year older than most of the guys ahead of him, but who cares? The dude could play ball.

I think that we can learn a lot about what “high floor” prospect means from Saddiq Bey by doing a little redraft experiment. Of the 2020 prospects, what would be your amended lottery, knowing what you know now? For myself, I put him somewhere in the 7-10 range. Now ask yourself, is he any different than the draft experts thought he’d be?

I don’t think he is, really. Aside from his 51-point outburst in March of 2022, Bey has been every bit of what we thought he’d be, and not much more. He plays good defense, shoots the hell out of the ball, and doesn’t really make mistakes.

So then why, if we knew what he’d be all the way back in 2020, did he slip to 19th? He was 15th on the consensus board, so he was even passed up four more spots than he should have been in the media’s mind. What went on during draft night?

Well, just like LaMelo, NBA teams are drawn far more to potential. Say Bey should have gone 15th, like the consensus board says he should have. The four guys drafted in between there and where he actually went at 19th were all upside picks.

The #15 pick Cole Anthony was an inefficient guard who was drafted in the lottery more-or-less because of his pedigree. That pedigree, for the record, worked out, and he’s played solid basketball for the Magic. Perhaps he’s not going to lead them to a ring, but we certainly can't say he's a bust. Nevertheless, I think if you were to ask most people, they’d pick Bey over Anthony for his ability to play a complimentary role.

The #16 pick was Isaiah Stewart. Stewart is best known for his Micah Parsons impersonation when trying to attack LeBron James – and to be honest, I think that may be the most we’ll ever hear about him. He was a freak athlete (all high-upside guys are), and not much more.

The 17th pick was Aleksej Pokusevski, or “Poku” as Thunder fans call him. Unless you find yourself within the confines of Oklahoma (and I pray you don’t), you would probably rather have Saddiq Bey suiting up alongside Chet Holmgren than the perpetually underperforming “high-upside” Poku. When a guy is entering his third year and we don’t know if he can play solid minutes on a tanking team, it may be time to give up the dream.

Lastly, the 18th pick was made by the Mavericks to take Josh Green. He was a great athlete out of Arizona, “oozing with potential” according to some. Since then, the narrative has not changed much, although two years have passed. When your local writers are writing articles entitled “Josh Green still has a chance”, it may be time to say you made the wrong pick.

So then, four “high upside” guys, and not one reached the levels that Bey did. Maybe if we thought about “high floor guys” as “top 10 talents” instead, we could have a more accurate perception of where they should be drafted.

Lesson Learned: A rock-solid high floor prospect is usually a top 10 player in the draft.

Tyrese Haliburton (#12 overall to the Sacramento Kings)

The one that got away.

I think Tyrese Haliburton can teach us one of the most valuable lessons about the draft process, something I have been hammering on about for awhile and something I intend to write a lengthy piece about at some point: The media has something to say.

NBA general managers are so damn prideful. That is why Tyrese Haliburton, who was #8 on the media Consensus board, slipped all the way to #12. There is no other explanation other than that every team from 8-11 thought they knew better. We could even throw #6 and #7 in there too, because about half of the people in the media saw him as worth those picks too (if we take the averages around him being #8 on the consensus board). Half a dozen teams thought that they knew better than the aggregated media, who from what I can tell did not have a single outlet that put him lower than 10.

I think part of the problem here is that NBA teams like to think of themselves as smarter than media evaluators. Back in the day this may have even been true – they were the only people that employed full-time talent scouts. But in the modern landscape of basketball, the film that was once confined behind closed doors is basically public. Plenty of people can do their own scouting; not only that, but they can do it well.

What teams don’t seem to realize is that the media poses many advantages for the draft process. For one, it gives you a general basis for how you can expect other teams to value certain players. Secondly, it provides an Overton window of sorts for how you yourself view each prospect. I’m not saying that teams should trust the media with every selection (although they’d probably be better off if they did); I only think that if a guy expected to be at the top of the draft falls down to number 11, maybe you should trust the aggregated media’s opinion more than your own eyes. The media can provide a check and a balance on your own evaluations, so use it!

The Suns are a team that could have leveraged this paradigm quite well in the 2020 draft. Phoenix's problem was not that they drafted Jalen Smith two spots ahead of Haliburton, but that they did not leverage their position in the draft to acquire Smith later on. Smith was #22 on the consensus board – meaning that, reasonably, the Suns could have traded back to 18 or so to get their guy (18 being a conservative estimate... To reiterate, Smith was on average taken at 22, so 18 would have still been a reach if we’re going by the consensus board). Nevertheless, the Suns could have picked up another draft pick, or maybe even a player, by moving back in the draft. Sure, Smith would have busted either way, but if teams can leverage the data gained from the media, they could mitigate risk and increase the overall value of their pick by not reaching for guys that no one was even considering taking at their pick.

Lesson Learned: Utilize the Media – it’s the only intel every other team has too. If you’re high on a guy, trade back and maximize value. If you’re on the fence, trust that the dozens of talent evaluators within the media might see something you don’t.